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TIHANA MATOSEVIC*, MARTIN KNAPP*, JULIAN LE GRAND#
and JOSE-LUIS FERNANDEZ*
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the provider side of the care-home sector and focuses on
managers’ and owners’ motivations for providing care-home services for older
people, and whether those motivations changed between 1994 and 2003. There
were a number of signiﬁcant policy changes over that time, including an in-
creased ‘marketisation’ of the sector, coupled with an increase in regulation.
Critics of these changes argued that they could adversely aﬀect the motivational
structure of the principal provider agents. Previously altruistic or public-service
motivations might turn into more self-interested concerns : ‘knights ’ might be-
come ‘knaves ’. To test this proposition, data were collected across eight English
local authorities using face-to-face interviews and postal questionnaires. The re-
sults indicate that, although local care-home markets underwent some major
changes, individuals’ motivational proﬁles remained relatively stable. Further
analysis of the relationship between motivations and the social-care market en-
vironment suggests that, while voluntary-sector providers are primarily driven by
caring motivations and less concerned with income maximising and professional
development, private-sector home manager and owners seemed to be more fo-
cused on the ﬁnancial aspects of providing care services, professional motivations,
and on their independence in running a care home. The policy implications of
these ﬁndings are discussed.
KEY WORDS – motivations, care-home managers, care-home owners, knights,
knaves, older people, marketisation, independent sector.
Introduction
Over the last decade, care-home services for older people in England have
gone through major changes. The modernisation of services started in the
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early 1990s with the National Health Service and Community Care Act.1 Many of
the principles espoused in that Act are still recognised as the drivers
of today’s social-care reforms, even if there have been major ﬁnancial,
operational and attitudinal changes concerning older people’s social care
during the subsequent two decades, many of which can be subsumed in
the term ‘marketisation’. Critics of these reforms have argued that they
could adversely aﬀect the motivational structure of the principal agents
involved. More speciﬁcally, the previously prevalent altruistic or public-
service motivations might turn into more self-interested concerns, or in
short, ‘knights ’ might become ‘knaves ’ (Le Grand 2006; Titmuss 1970).
The aims of this paper are to explore whether, as a consequence of social-
care marketisation, increased competition and increased regulation, the
motivations of independent-sector residential-care providers have indeed
changed over time, and if so, to identify the factors associated with the
changes.
The focus is on the independent-sector care-home managers and own-
ers between 1994 and 2003. It has long been recognised that the motiva-
tions of social-care actors need to be understood and taken into account in
the process of policy design (Le Grand 1997, 2006; Le Grand and Bartlett
1993). With care market structures and service commissioning becoming
more sophisticated in their own right, the providers’ motivations have
become even more important in understanding the nature of care-home
markets. From the strategic perspective, a better understanding of provi-
ders’ motivations is important for developing services capable of re-
sponding adequately to demographic changes. In England, the proportion
of people aged 85 and over is projected to increase by two-thirds over the
next 20 years (Wanless et al. 2006: 31). It is uncertain, however, what
proportion of the older population will become dependent and in need of
care services and support. With the marked emphasis on personalised care
services, choice, prevention and rehabilitation, and on improving the
interface between health and social care, it is diﬃcult to predict what the
social-care system will look like over the coming decades.
The conceptual framework proposed here is relatively inclusive in that
individuals’ motivations and actions are considered to be essentially the
outcomes of the interactions between individual aspirations and external
inﬂuences, with the nature of the interactions mediated by a speciﬁcally
designed incentive structure. This paper builds on our earlier work on the
motivations of independent-sector care-providers (Kendall et al. 2003;
Matosevic et al. 2007). While the focus of these previous studies was
primarily on developing providers’ motivational typologies principally
using cross-sectional data, the present paper is concerned with whether
and how providers’ motivations changed over time. We look at changes
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from 1994 to 2003, a period of not only the noted major changes in policy
and state funding, but also in the population’s attitudes towards purchas-
ing care.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section brieﬂy outlines the
sector balance and expenditure activity of the care-home market for older
people together with a short overview of the introduction of markets in
social care. This is followed by a brief description of the key regulatory
developments associated with changes in care-home markets since the
early 1990s. The sampling methodology and methods for data analysis are
then described followed by the presentation of the results. The last section
draws some conclusions and discusses policy implications.
Sector balance
During the 1980s ‘privatisation’ came to the forefront of British public
policy. There was a major change in the provision of state services from
the public to the independent sector (i.e. to both for-proﬁt and voluntary or
third-sector non-proﬁt care providers). Largely as a result of opening up
the supply side, the independent sector became the dominant provider of
care services for older people in England. In outline, the care reforms of the
early 1990s resulted in a major shift that ended the dominance of local
authority providers and created a more mixed economy of supply, with
greater market shares for the independent sectors (Hardy, Young and
Wistow 1999). In 1994, privately-owned and voluntary-sector care homes
provided care for 75 per cent of all people accommodated in care homes
(Department of Health 1994). Since then, the market share of the inde-
pendent sector has steadily grown, and by 2003, it accounted for 87 per
cent of all residents (Department of Health 2003a). Recent ﬁgures indicate
that the trend has continued, with 89 per cent of all residents accom-
modated in this sector in 2007 (Laing and Buisson 2007). It is also the case
that care homes for older people are becoming larger but without apparent
domination by corporate providers (Wanless et al. 2006: 22).
Markets in social care
The encouragement of social-care markets was at the heart of the com-
munity-care changes set out in the 1990 National Health Service and Community
Care Act. The hope for markets was that they would provide more eﬀective
means for securing the social policy goals that drove the community-care
reforms. They were supposed to rectify the failure of the prevailing ad-
ministrative hierarchies to deliver services tailored to individual needs and
preferences. With the social-care market model came new organisational
and funding arrangements that were designed to provide more eﬀective
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instruments for the promotion of choice and independence. Under these
changes, local authority social services departments were required to as-
sume new roles and responsibilities for market management and devel-
opment, which required a revolution in systems, attitudes and behaviours
at all levels (Wistow et al. 1996). The opening up of public services to
external and internal competition was expected to stimulate a wider range
of better-quality services.
An earlier study of residential care providers concluded that
neither pure market nor pure hierarchy is an appropriate governance structure
for the successful operation of the mixed economy of social care. Instead, some
intermediate form of quasi-market (embedded in a social network) where re-
lationships are more integrated and collaborative appears more desirable.
(Wistow et al. 1996: 171)
Quasi-markets emerged as an alternative to the established welfare state
with its limited provision of choice and ineﬃcient structures. According to
Le Grand:
they are markets because they replace the monopolistic state providers with
competitive independent ones. They are ‘quasi ’ because they diﬀer from con-
ventional markets in a number of key areas. The diﬀerences are on both the
supply and the demand sides. (1991 : 1259–60)
Supply is not necessarily driven by the proﬁt motive, and as for the de-
mand, users do not make choices regarding purchasing of services but the
services are purchased by a third party on their behalf.
It was also assumed that the market mechanism would formalise com-
missioner–provider relationships through contracts, and that they would
ensure better regulation and monitoring of services (Forder, Knapp and
Wistow 1996). Le Grand and Bartlett pointed out that
the whole movement of bringing market structures into the area of social care in
the early 1990s was part of a wider, worldwide disenchantment with the perceived
ineﬃciencies and unresponsiveness of large-scale, centrally planned organisations
and a greater reliance on decentralisation and markets ; quasi or otherwise.
(1993: 9)
Following the pioneering work of Titmuss (1970), many critics have drawn
attention to what they perceive to be the dangers of such market-oriented
reform (see Le Grand 2006: 40–1 for a summary). Speciﬁcally, it was argued
that the spread of market incentives will damage altruistic or other pro-
fessional motivations, replacing them by more self-interested (usually
ﬁnancial) aspirations. Intrinsic motivation (the drive to do things for their
own sake) will be driven out by extrinsic motivation (doing things only
because of the receipt external reward). Other-directed knights will
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become egoistic knaves. Part of the aim of this paper is to test these pro-
positions.
The policy context and care-homemanagers’ and owners’ motivations
Increased marketisation has not been the only signiﬁcant change over
the period. There have been related policy changes, mostly involving
increased central regulation of various kinds. These, too, might be expected
to have an eﬀect on provider motivations, as we shall now see. In the period
from the early 1990s up to 2003, independent-sector care-home managers
and owners were faced with a number of organisational and ﬁnancial
challenges, including changes in care-home regulations, staﬀ shortages
(particularly of care staﬀ), and the bureaucratisation of care services. Each
of these might have inﬂuenced providers’ motivations.
The regulation of care homes for older people
The Social Services Inspectorate was established in 1985 as the ﬁrst
national inspectorate for the personal social services in England, and it held
the responsibility until 2004. It was responsible for carrying out inspections,
bringing professional experience to bear on policy and supporting its im-
plementation, and securing the eﬀective management of government
business on social-care matters (Department of Health 2004). The inspec-
torate had a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on policy across children’s and adults’
services. The period between 1995 and 1998 saw a drive towards a more
systematic approach to standards. In 1997, the Social Services Inspectorate
published ﬁve volumes of standards that had been developed and used
between 1993 and 1996. This was followed in 2001 by the introduction of
‘ star ratings ’ and the ﬁrst star ratings published tables in May 2002. By
2003–04, performance assessment had become a regular practice.
With regards to regulations, there has been increased pressure for in-
dependent-sector care homes to meet the National Minimum Standards for
Care Homes for Older People published in March 2001 with eﬀect from April
2002 (Department of Health 2001). The standards were designed to pro-
tect older people in care homes and to promote their health and quality of
life. Because many care homes, particularly the smaller establishments,
were unable to comply with some of the new standards (particularly the
space requirements), the 2002 standards were amended in March 2003
(Department of Health 2003b). Evidence showed that care homes for older
people were compliant on average with 72 per cent of the standards
(Wanless et al. 2006).
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As a result of the new regulations, many small care home organisations
found themselves under great ﬁnancial pressures to meet the standards,
again particularly the space and environmental requirements. Evidence
from a study of home closures found that meeting the costs of the National
Minimum Standards was one of the main reasons for closure (Williams et al.
2002). Particularly onerous was the investment required to upgrade build-
ings, the revenue implications of need to reduce the number of rooms or
residents, and anticipated increases in running costs associated with the
raised staﬀ ratios and qualiﬁcations. Under these circumstances, it was
assumed that the higher costs would change providers’ motivations; for
instance, providers that previously were not greatly concerned with their
personal income and proﬁt maximising were likely to become more ﬁ-
nancially orientated.
Care staﬀ recruitment and retention
A number of regulatory issues relating to the social care workforce could,
either directly of indirectly, have had an eﬀect on the delivery and quality
of services (Wanless et al. 2006). For a long time, staﬀ recruitment and
retention had been a key challenge for the social-care sector (Henwood
2001). Problems with recruiting and retaining care staﬀ are generally as-
sociated with low wages, poor working conditions and keen competition
for staﬀ in local labour markets. The rate of job vacancies in the social-
care sector has until recently been high: there were 53,000 in England in
2004. The National Employers Skills Survey found that in 2003, vacancy
rates in social care were about twice as high as those for the whole of all
private-sector and public-sector jobs in England (Eborall 2005; Wanless
et al. 2006). Turnover rates in public-sector homes have also been high, at
between 8.7 and 17.1 per cent in England in 2003 (Wanless et al. 2006).
Home providers have faced severe ﬁnancial pressures associated with
staﬃng costs. According to those that participated in a Personal Social
Service Research Unit (PSSRU) study of home closures, the introduction
of the National Minimum Wage meant that the fees they could charge
were insuﬃcient to cover their costs (Williams et al. 2002). There were
also additional costs from a Working Time Directive that entitled staﬀ
to four weeks of paid leave. Those ﬁnancial pressures may have forced
providers to change their priorities and compromised their caring moti-
vations.
Bureaucratisation of care-home services for older people
The high level of bureaucracy imposed on providers by sector regulation
and contracts with local authority funders has been generally recognised
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as a disincentive or barrier to running care-home services. Many
managers and owners complain about the huge increase in paperwork and
administrative tasks involved in running a care home and how it reduced
the time available to look after their clients, and many that participated in
our surveys emphasised the changing nature of their role as care providers.
The increased administrative load has left many feeling professionally
frustrated and unable to realise their full potential.
Study design, sampling and data collection
Information was collected about care-home managers and owners be-
tween 1994 and 2003 as part of the Department of Health-funded pro-
gramme of research in PSSRU. There were three care-home provider
studies. The ﬁrst in 1994 used a sample of 62 homes selected from eight
English local authorities : two London boroughs, three administrative
counties and three Metropolitan districts. These eight authorities were
broadly representative of the national picture with regard to total expen-
diture on personal social services (PSS) per head of population, political
control, and the percentages of places in residential care homes for
older people in the private and voluntary sectors. The second study
in 1997 collected information from 53 homes, including 40 that had
been in the earlier sample. Again, home managers and owners were
interviewed. Finally, in 2003 information was gathered from 58 homes,
26 of which had been included in the previous two studies. Non-
response reduced the number of local authority areas included in this
ﬁnal round of data collection to seven (in one local authority, one of
the two homes from the original sample in 1994 had closed for business,
and the manager/owner of the other home was unavailable for an inter-
view).
The information about care-home managers’ and owners’ motivations
was collected through face-to-face semi-structured interviews and postal
questionnaires. These research instruments included questions about
home characteristics and market experiences, prices and contracts, pro-
viders’ motivations and their relationship with the local authority. To
compare information regarding motivations, the questions about pro-
vider motivations were the same in all three studies. All the inter-
views were recorded and transcribed. The ﬁrst part of the analysis
is based on the follow-up information collected from this original
sample of 26 homes in seven English local authorities. The second set
of ﬁndings is based on the analysis of the combined samples from all three
studies.
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Results
Sample characteristics
Out of 26 homes, 15 were owned by private-for-proﬁt organisations,
and 11 homes were in the voluntary sector. From the original sample of
62 homes selected in 1994, 42 per cent were subsequently interviewed
in both 1997 and 2004. Fourteen of the 26 homes were part of a larger
organisation, six being private or for-proﬁt sector, eight homes being in
the voluntary non-proﬁt sector. The remaining 12 were single home or-
ganisations, of which nine were privately owned. As for the geographical
spread of the 26 homes, the numbers varied from only one home in one
local authority to six in another. In terms of the status of the interviewee,
the sample consisted of 18 care-home managers and eight care-home
proprietors.
Comparisons over time : expressed motivations
Meeting the needs of older people was cited as one of the important mo-
tivations in all three years (89% in 1994 and 1997, and 92% in 2003)
(Table 1). A large proportion of the respondents identiﬁed professional
accomplishment as one of their main motives (73% in 1994 and 2003,
and 89% in 1997), and the number citing the development of skills and
expertise grew over time (54% in 1994, 65% in 1997, and 77% in 2003). A
satisfactory level of personal income was equally important in 1994 and
1997, but had higher prevalence in 2003 (73%). Achieving ‘ independence
and autonomy’ also became more prevalent, from 42 per cent in 1997
to 62 per cent in 1994 and 2003, as did fulﬁlling a ‘duty to society ’, from
23 per cent in 1994 to 46 per cent in 1997 and 2003. By far the least
T A B L E 1. Expressed motivations of care-home managers and owners, England, 1994,
1997 and 2003
Motivations 1994 1997 2003
Frequencies (%)
To meet the needs of older people 23 (89) 23 (89) 24 (92)
Professional accomplishment 19 (73) 23 (89) 19 (73)
Developing/using skills and expertise 14 (54) 17 (65) 20 (77)
Satisfactory level of personal income 16 (62) 16 (62) 19 (73)
Independence and autonomy 17 (65) 11 (42) 17 (65)
Duty/responsibility to society as a whole 6 (23) 12 (46) 12 (46)
Duty/responsibility to a section of society 12 (46) 11 (42) 13 (50)
Income and proﬁt maximising 3 (12) 2 (8) 3 (12)
Sample size 26 26 26
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important reported drive in all three years was proﬁt maximising. In both
1994 and 2003, only 12 per cent of interviewees selected this as a main
motive, and in 1997 it was only 8 per cent.
Paired-samples tests were used to identify signiﬁcant diﬀerences be-
tween years in the prevalence of the expressed motivations. Although none
were found for the overall samples or by sector, there were clear numerical
trends (Table 2). Over time, voluntary-sector care-home mangers attached
greater weight to developing skills and to a satisfactory level of personal
income. For private-sector care-home managers and owners, developing
skills became more prevalent over the study period, while the weight at-
tached to achievement of a level of personal income was stable.
Comparisons over time : ranked motivations
The 26 respondents’ three most important motivations were collected.
Looking at the ﬁrst-ranked motives in 1994 (Table 3), meeting the needs of
older people was the most prevalent motivation (eight), followed by pro-
fessional accomplishment (ﬁve), and duty to a particular section of society
(four). ‘ Income and proﬁt maximising’ and ‘duty to society ’ were each
nominated by only one respondent as their most important motivation. In
1997, again the most prevalent ﬁrst motivation was meeting the needs of
older people (seven), followed by the ﬁve who nominated a satisfactory
level of personal income, and then three nominations for each of pro-
fessional accomplishment, development of skills and duty to a particular
section of society. The rankings in 2003 were quite diﬀerent, however,
with personal income as the most prevalent motivation (seven) closely
followed by the six that nominated meeting the needs of older people, and
six nominations for development of skills.
T A B L E 2.Motivations of care-home managers and owners by sector, England, 1994,
1997 and 2003
Motivation and sector 1994 1997 2003 Sample size
Frequencies (%)
Meeting the needs of older people :
Private 12 (80) 12 (80) 13 (87) 15
Voluntary 11 (100) 11 (100) 11 (100) 11
Developing skills and expertise :
Private 7 (47) 9 (60) 11 (73) 15
Voluntary 7 (63) 8 (73) 9 (82) 11
Satisfactory level of personal income:
Private 11 (73) 11 (73) 11 (73) 15
Voluntary 5 (46) 5 (46) 8 (73) 11
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The ﬁndings therefore indicate a slight change in the most prevalent
motivations across the three points in time. Whereas meeting the needs of
older people was clearly the most important motive in 1994 and 1997, it
was supplanted by achieving a satisfactory level of personal income in
2003, although meeting the needs of older people was close behind.
Personal income and development of skills have become more important
over the years, but on the other hand, independence and autonomy, and
duty to a particular section of society became less important. None of the
changes were statistically signiﬁcant. Overall, an ‘average’ care-home
provider in 2003 was highly motivated by gaining satisfactory personal
income and meeting the needs of older people, and secondarily by using
and developing professional skills and achieving a sense of accomplishment.
Meeting the needs of older people was the most prevalent second moti-
vation in all three years (seven in 1994 and 2003, and ten in 1997).
Professional accomplishment was also relatively prevalent in 1997 (eight),
but less frequently selected in 2003 (ﬁve). Meeting older peoples’ needs
was also the most frequently nominated third motivation in all three years,
and other relatively prevalent motivations were professional accomplish-
ment, satisfactory personal income, and achieving independence and
autonomy.
The expressed motivations were also ranked by the sector of provision
in which the managers and owners worked (Table 4). For voluntary-sector
providers, caring motivations, developing skills and achieving a satisfactory
level of personal income became more prevalent over time. For private-
sector providers, the prevalence of meeting the needs of older people as
the ﬁrst-ranked motivation decreased over time, a marginally signiﬁcant
result (ﬁve in 1994, one in 2003). The only signiﬁcant diﬀerence was in the
prevalence of meeting the needs of older people (Table 4). In 2003, caring
T A B L E 3. First-ranked motivations of care-home managers and owners, England,
1994, 1997 and 2003
Motivations 1994 1997 2003 x2 p
Frequencies (%)
To meet the needs of older people 8 (31) 7 (27) 6 (23) 0.43 0.807
Professional accomplishment 5 (19) 3 (12) 4 (15) 0.67 0.717
Developing/using skills and expertise 2 (8) 3 (12) 6 (23) 3.25 0.197
Satisfactory level of personal income 2 (8) 5 (19) 7 (27) 3.17 0.205
Independence and autonomy 3 (12) 2 (8) 1 (4) 2.00 0.368
Duty/responsibility to society as a whole 1 (4) 2 (8) 1 (4) 0.50 0.779
Duty/responsibility to a section of society 4 (15) 3 (12) 1 (4) 2.00 0.368
Income and proﬁt maximising 1 (4) 1 (4) 0 1.00 0.607
Sample size 26 26 26
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for older people was signiﬁcantly more important for voluntary-sector
providers than for managers and owners in privately run homes (Table 5).
In summary, despite the relatively small sample, the analysis has shown
that in broad terms the providers’ motivational proﬁles were relatively
stable between 1994 and 2003.
Relationship between motivations and markets
Further analysis of the relationship between providers’ motivations and
the changing market environment has been conducted. A second panel
dataset was compiled that pooled the information from all the 173 homes
that were sampled in 1994, 1997 and 2003, and added a number of market
indicators that might have shaped the providers’ motivations. Provider
characteristics such as expressed motivations, sector, the size of the homes,
and geographical locations were all included as indicators in the analysis.
Data were not available for all providers in the sample at all three time-
points. The analysis applied a panel probit model using the command
XTPROBIT from Stata 9, which accommodates the unbalanced nature
of the panel dataset (Baltagi and Song 2006). The indicators of market
characteristics (broadly deﬁned) were identiﬁed from standard data sour-
ces, and pertaining demand, local authority funding of residents, costs and
home attributes (Table 6). The data are time series of observations for
each manager or owner, including individual characteristics and the
associated local authority’s care-home market characteristics. Panel data
analysis was used to examine the relationships between provider motiva-
tions and these market characteristics. Using this approach, it was possible
to explore not only the diﬀerences between care-home managers and
owners but also the intra-individual dynamics of care-home providers,
T A B L E 4. First-ranked motivations of care-home managers and owners by sector,
England, 1994, 1997 and 2003 by sector
Motivation and sector 1994 1997 2003 Sample size
Frequencies (%)
Meeting the needs of older people :
Private 5 (33) 4 (27) 1 (7) 15
Voluntary 3 (27) 3 (27) 5 (46) 11
Developing skills and expertise :
Private 1 (7) 2 (13) 4 (27) 15
Voluntary 1 (9) 1 (9) 2 (18) 11
Satisfactory level of personal income:
Private 1 (7) 2 (13) 4 (27) 15
Voluntary 1 (9) 3 (27) 3 (27) 11
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hence oﬀering greater capacity for capturing the nature of individual
behaviour (Hsiao 2006). The panel data were analysed using probit re-
gression models.
The analysis examines the dynamics between motivations and market
conditions, focusing on diﬀerent aspects of the care-home market. These
include the numbers of older people in care homes, the numbers of
local authority older residents, weekly gross earnings, local property pri-
ces, the average size of care homes in the local authority, local authority
T A B L E 5. First-ranked motive in 2003 by sector
Motivations
Private
sector
(N=15)
Voluntary
sector
(N=11)
Both
sectors
(N=26) x2 p
Frequencies (%)
To meet the needs of older people 1 (7) 5 (46) 6 (23) 5.172 0.023**
Professional accomplishment 3 (20) 1 (9) 4 (15) 0.558 0.455
Developing/using skills and expertise 4 (27) 2 (18) 6 (23) 0.247 0.619
Satisfactory level of personal income 4 (27) 3 (27) 7 (27) 0.001 0.973
Independence and autonomy 1 (7) 0 1 (4) 0.733 0.392
Duty/responsibility to society as a whole 1 (7) 0 1 (4) 0.733 0.392
Duty/responsibility to a
particular section of society
1 (7) 0 1 (4) 0.733 0.392
Income and proﬁt maximizing 0 0 0 0 1.000
Signiﬁcance level : ** p<0.01.
T A B L E 6. Sources of data on care-home market characteristics in England, 1994,
1997 and 2003
Domain Indicator Data source
Demand Local authority population
aged 65+years
Population Statistics for 1994, 1997 and 2003
(Oﬃce for National Statistics)
Local authority-supported
residents
Community Care Statistics for 1994, 1997
and 2003 (Department of Health 1994, 2003a)
Number of care home places Statistical Bulletin (Department of Health 1994,
1997, 2003a)
Homes that open/closed MEOC data for 1994, 1997 and 2003
Costs Weekly gross earnings (£) New Earnings Survey data for 1994,
1997 and 2003 (Oﬃce of National Statistics)
Property prices (£) Land Registry Statistics for 1994, 1997 and 2003
Expenditure Local authority gross expenditure
(£) on older people services
Personal Social Services Statistics for 1994,
1997 and 2003 (Department of Health)
Care homes Size of care homes MEOC data for 1994, 1997 and 2003
Sector of ownership MEOC data for 1994, 1997 and 2003
Note : MEOC: Mixed Economy of Care.
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expenditure on services for older people, local authority wealth index, and
whether the care homes were open throughout the period from 1994 to
2003 (Table 6). The dependent variable is provider motivation, deﬁned as
the presence or absence of each of the nominated motivations among
the care-home providers. The analysis focuses on three key motives : pro-
fessional development, meeting the needs of older people, and achieving
a satisfactory personal income.
Motivation models
Table 7 shows the model statistics for the three motivations. Statistically
signiﬁcant coeﬃcients (at the 5% level) are noted. Diﬀerent combinations
of the indicators listed in Table 6 were tested in order to generate the
optimal set of variables for each of the three motivations. Since some of
the indicators such as property prices and staﬀ weekly wages were highly
correlated, these were tested in the models interchangeably. The results
for the motivation models (Table 7) included all the variables found to be
correlated in any of the three models. To ensure that the indicators were
reported consistently across the models, the same sets of variables were
presented in all of the models. The results for the income model reveal two
strong signiﬁcant eﬀects. One relates to the sector of ownership and income
motivation, with a signiﬁcantly negative relationship between monetary
motivations and sector : over time, voluntary-sector providers have
T A B L E 7. Motivation models
Model (motivation) and independent variables Coeﬃcient p
Income motivation:
Population aged 65+ years 7.347 0.029
Home still open in 2003 0.337 0.368
Mean female weekly earnings (standardised for inﬂation) 1.682 0.066
Voluntary non-proﬁt sector x0.714 0.022
Professional motivation:
Population aged 65+ years 7.835 0.062
Home still open in 2003 0.660 0.051
Property prices (standardised for inﬂation) 0.692 0.006
Voluntary non-proﬁt sector x0.695 0.009
Meeting the needs of older people :
Population aged 65+ years x0.806 0.869
Home still open in 2003 x0.177 0.719
Property prices (standardised for inﬂation) 0.031 0.893
Sector (private care homes) x0.956 0.022
Note : The motivation models were estimated using the panel probit regression.
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become less interested in generating income compared to private providers.
The second signiﬁcant relationship was found between the proportion of
the population aged 65 or more years and income motive. These results
imply that, under conditions of high demand for care-home services,
such a market environment is more likely to attract primarily income-
orientated providers.
The results for the professional motivations model show signiﬁcant positive
relationships between professional aspirations and local property prices,
the proportion of the population aged 65 or more years and whether the
home remained open in 2003. These results imply that, over the study
period, professionally-motivated respondents were more likely to stay in
business for longer periods. A signiﬁcant relationship between property
prices and professional drives could be partly attributed to their residents’
expectations with regards to the standards and quality of care-home ser-
vices. For instance, it is possible that in wealthier local authorities, service
users (and their families) have relatively high expectations of care homes,
and meeting their demands requires strong professional motivation and
skills, and therefore a higher concentration of professionally-orientated
managers and owners. Similar to the income model, a strong negative
relationship was found between professional motivations and the sector of
ownership: between 1994 and 2003, voluntary-sector managers tended
to be less driven (compared to private-sector managers/owners) by pro-
fessional aspirations. The model for the third motivation, to meet the needs of
older people, indicates a strong negative relationship with private-sector own-
ership but no other signiﬁcant eﬀects (Table 7). These results broadly
correspond to the ﬁndings from the earlier analyses for the sub-sample of
26 homes for which we had data at all three time-points : caring for older
people was the only signiﬁcant diﬀerence between private- and voluntary-
sector providers. Although these results are far from conclusive, they
nevertheless demonstrate that there has been some change in the priorities
given by private-sector respondents in terms of their caring motivations.
Conclusions and policy implications
The analysis of care-home managers’ and owners’ expressed motivations
in England between 1994 and 2003 indicates a broadly stable pattern. For
both private-sector and voluntary-sector providers, caring for older people
was the most important expressed motivation. Other prominent motives
were developing skills, professional development, and personal income.
The analysis of the ranked data revealed no signiﬁcant diﬀerence except
when disaggregated by sector of ownership. The evidence suggested that
1402 Tihana Matosevic et al.
by 2003 the most prevalent motivations had changed slightly for private-
sector providers since 1994. ‘Caring for older people ’ was the only
motivation on which the two independent sectors diﬀered, with relatively
fewer private-sector care-home managers and owners selecting this drive.
The ﬁndings suggest private-sector providers had to an extent responded
to changing market conditions in the care-home sector. According to
Bartlett and Le Grand (1993), a number of speciﬁc conditions need to
be met if markets are to be successful in becoming more eﬃcient and
responsive and in creating more choice. They argued that
providers ought to be motivated at least in part by ﬁnancial considerations. If they
are not, they will not respond appropriately to market signals. It makes little sense
introducing a market to create proﬁtable opportunities, if the participants in the
market are not interested in making proﬁts. (1993 : 30)
The motivational models largely conﬁrmed some of the views that are
widely shared among policy makers, local authority commissioners and
purchasers. For instance, the voluntary sector is perceived to be less in-
terested in income and professional development, and mainly driven by
caring motivations, while private-sector homes seemed to be more con-
cerned with ﬁnancial aspects of care provision, as well as autonomy and
independence. The ﬁndings of this study suggest, however, that market
developments between 1994 and 2003 had relatively little eﬀect on the
nature of care-home providers’ motivations. Despite extremely challeng-
ing market pressures, care-home managers and owners had by and large
preserved their initial motivations. In the context of social-care provision,
these results could be interpreted as both encouraging and quite damaging.
The positive aspect is that, broadly speaking, motivations are quite resist-
ant to market pressures. On the negative side, the relatively stable nature
of providers’ motives could create opportunities for moving toward poli-
cies and reforms that could potentially take their motivations for granted.
As for the policy implications, the evidence that provider motivations
are likely to stay relatively unchanged over longer periods of time provides
a valuable insight into the dynamic of motivational structures and market
mechanisms. Of particular relevance for the policy is the ﬁnding that
professional motivations are a prominent feature of the providers’ moti-
vational proﬁle. Essentially, the results demonstrated that the individuals
with a more distinct professional drive tended to remain in the care-home
business for longer. This is undoubtedly important for the quality of care
ensuring that services are delivered by professionally motivated individuals
and with a certain degree of continuity.
Although the motivations were found to be relatively stable, the study
did not examine changes in motivations under more extreme conditions
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such as experiences of home closures. The sample only included homes
which managed to survive in the market for a certain period of time by
adapting to often diﬃcult market conditions. Furthermore, the analysis
was based on the assumption that the sample was relatively homogeneous
which could potentially create a slightly distorted view that, over time, no
changes had been found in providers’ motivations. It is possible that the
analytical framework used was relatively robust in order to detect local
variations within the sample local authorities.
It would have been interesting to examine the motives of care-home
managers and owners who declined to take part in the study. However,
considering the reasons for not taking part (e.g. four homes had closed
between the ﬁrst and second surveys, several managers had moved on to
other jobs), it was concluded that those observations were unlikely signiﬁ-
cantly to inﬂuence the main ﬁndings. Moreover, the practical challenges
of gathering data from or about people who were no longer working in the
sector would have been considerable. The growth of marketisation has
had a long-lasting eﬀect on the nature of the social-care system for older
people (Knapp, Hardy and Forder 2001), but the concern that a conse-
quence is that knights will have turned into knaves is largely unfounded.
NOTE
1 See http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1990/ukpga_19900019_en_1.htm.
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